6 of 9 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 6 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2407.07791.json · badge: /api/ran/2407.07791.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
6 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| process_system_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/prompt.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("23fedb033c4eb319") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| process_system_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/prompt_defense.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("e505f066d4de6882") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| prompt_template | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/baseline_easyedit.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("c27281e38be46bb2") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| prompt_template | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/prompt.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("c42bd9bc06461d7f") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| prompt_template | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/prompt_defense.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("799c1725a0ae3a17") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| prompt_template | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/prompt_supervision.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("5e336051b1af74cb") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| generate_answer | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/baseline_easyedit.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("41f7fbef0bb0cb0f") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| prompt_template | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/baseline_prompt_edit.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("c0e710682edfe8c0") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| rag_selection | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread/simulation/baseline_prompt_edit.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("54d520992cd8e5bf") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Jometeorie/KnowledgeSpread when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 9 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 9 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 8 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 8 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems has highlighted their impressive capabilities in various applications, such as collaborative problem-solving and autonomous negotiation. However, the security implications of these LLM-based multi-agent systems have not been thoroughly investigated, particularly concerning the spread of manipulated knowledge. In this paper, we investigate this critical issue by constructing a detailed threat model and a comprehensive simulation environment that mirrors real-world multi-agent deployments in a trusted platform. Subsequently, we propose a novel two-stage attack method involving Persuasiveness Injection and Manipulated Knowledge Injection to systematically explore the potential for manipulated knowledge (i.e., counterfactual and toxic knowledge) spread without explicit prompt manipulation. Our method leverages the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs in handling world knowledge, which can be exploited by attackers to unconsciously spread fabricated information. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our attack method can successfully induce LLM-based agents to spread both counterfactual and toxic knowledge without degrading their foundational capabilities during agent communication. Furthermore, we show that these manipulations can persist through popular retrieval-augmented generation frameworks, where several benign agents store and retrieve manipulated chat histories for future interactions. This persistence indicates that even after the interaction has ended, the benign agents may continue to be influenced by manipulated knowledge. Our findings reveal significant security risks in LLM-based multi-agent systems, emphasizing the imperative need for robust defenses against manipulated knowledge spread, such as introducing ``guardian'' agents and advanced fact-checking tools.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2407.07791")
get_code_for_paper("2407.07791")
have("2407.07791")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2407.07791.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2407.07791)
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