Yejin Choi, Alisa Liu, Noah Smith, Sewoong Oh, Jonathan Hayase
1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2407.16607.json · badge: /api/ran/2407.16607.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| alisawuffles/tokenizer-attack | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| sample_from_unit_simplex | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
alisawuffles/tokenizer-attack/train_mixed_tokenizer.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("d5fd983805cb3b15") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, alisawuffles/tokenizer-attack when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The pretraining data of today's strongest language models is opaque; in particular, little is known about the proportions of various domains or languages represented. In this work, we tackle a task which we call data mixture inference, which aims to uncover the distributional make-up of training data. We introduce a novel attack based on a previously overlooked source of information: byte-pair encoding (BPE) tokenizers, used by the vast majority of modern language models. Our key insight is that the ordered list of merge rules learned by a BPE tokenizer naturally reveals information about the token frequencies in its training data. Given a tokenizer's merge list along with example data for each category of interest, we formulate a linear program that solves for the proportion of each category in the tokenizer's training set. In controlled experiments, we show that our attack recovers mixture ratios with high precision for tokenizers trained on known mixtures of natural languages, programming languages, and data sources. We then apply our approach to off-the-shelf tokenizers released with recent LMs. We confirm much publicly disclosed information about these models, and also make several new inferences: GPT-4O and MISTRAL NEMO's tokenizers are much more multilingual than their predecessors, training on 39% and 47% non-English language data, respectively; LLAMA 3 extends GPT-3.5's tokenizer primarily for multilingual (48%) use; GPT-3.5's and CLAUDE's tokenizers are trained on predominantly code (∼ 60%). We hope our work sheds light on current design practices for pretraining data, and inspires continued research into data mixture inference for LMs. 1 * Equal contribution, ordered alphabetically. 1 Code and detailed inferences available at https://github.com/alisawuffles/tokenizer-attack. 38th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2024).
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2407.16607")
get_code_for_paper("2407.16607")
have("2407.16607")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2407.16607.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2407.16607)
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