Cong Shen, Binchi Zhang, Jundong Li, Zihan Chen
1 of 3 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2408.00929.json · badge: /api/ran/2408.00929.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| zhangbinchi/unlearning-verification-is-fragile | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| conv3x3 | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
zhangbinchi/unlearning-verification-is-fragile/model.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from amerch/CIFAR100-Training, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("583f9780bdd00a45") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from amerch/CIFAR100-Training, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| load_data | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhangbinchi/unlearning-verification-is-fragile/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("38234ff439fdf903") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| load_dataset | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
zhangbinchi/unlearning-verification-is-fragile/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3d2b782b6e281b41") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 3 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 3 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 3 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 1 the same month, 1 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| conv3x3 | 686 other papers 618 dated earlier, 3 the same month, 48 later, 17 same year, order not determinable · 31 only as an assembly brick |
1406.2661 (2014-06) Generative Adversarial Networks |
1409.0575 (2014-09) ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge 1412.6572 (2014-12) Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples and 683 more not named here |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
As privacy concerns escalate in the realm of machine learning, data owners now have the option to utilize machine unlearning to remove their data from machine learning models, following recent legislation. To enhance transparency in machine unlearning and avoid potential dishonesty by model providers, various verification strategies have been proposed. These strategies enable data owners to ascertain whether their target data has been effectively unlearned from the model. However, our understanding of the safety issues of machine unlearning verification remains nascent. In this paper, we explore the novel research question of whether model providers can circumvent verification strategies while retaining the information of data supposedly unlearned. Our investigation leads to a pessimistic answer: the verification of machine unlearning is fragile. Specifically, we categorize the current verification strategies regarding potential dishonesty among model providers into two types. Subsequently, we introduce two novel adversarial unlearning processes capable of circumventing both types. We validate the efficacy of our methods through theoretical analysis and empirical experiments using real-world datasets. This study highlights the vulnerabilities and limitations in machine unlearning verification, paving the way for further research into the safety of machine unlearning.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2408.00929")
get_code_for_paper("2408.00929")
have("2408.00929")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2408.00929.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2408.00929)
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