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Paper · 2408.11313 · 2024

An Optimizable Suffix Is Worth A Thousand Templates: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking without Affirmative Phrases via LLM as Optimizer

arXiv · PDF · Open in the Atlas

Code that ran

2 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2408.11313.json · badge: /api/ran/2408.11313.svg

Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.

RepositoryRoleRan
lenijwp/eclipse canonical (classifier label)
classifier basis: classifier_2025
2 ran · 0 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
check_test Ran
ran, violated the contract we drafted
lenijwp/eclipse/Eclipse.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("e7a251d20e57f84f")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, lenijwp/eclipse when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

extract_suffix Ran
ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code
lenijwp/eclipse/Eclipse.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("c34b8ccc711936f9")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, lenijwp/eclipse when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.

Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.

Repositories linked to this paper

Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.

Abstract

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

For agents

The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:

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