4 of 4 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run); 1 of them was also run on the host, not in the jail, by the peer-agreement lane that set its level, measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2409.17476.json · badge: /api/ran/2409.17476.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Kaike-Zhang/VAT | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
4 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| str2bool | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
Kaike-Zhang/VAT/meta_config.py pointer only (licence: NONE); the stored copy get_code serves, from rlqja1107/nl-vsgg, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("7aef2a8cb287a30b") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Kaike-Zhang/VAT when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| get_APR_config | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Kaike-Zhang/VAT/utls/model_config.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("a1cf4ce0ab2f6b2a") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Kaike-Zhang/VAT when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| get_LightGCN_config | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Kaike-Zhang/VAT/utls/model_config.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("ba00e7a4d036e3b0") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Kaike-Zhang/VAT when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| get_MF_config | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
Kaike-Zhang/VAT/utls/model_config.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("1ef86eb0369e7317") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, Kaike-Zhang/VAT when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
Of 4 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 4 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 4 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| str2bool | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
2401.02913 (2024-01) Plug-In Diffusion Model for Sequential Recommendation |
2025.findings-emnlp.538 (2025 (year only)) SOLAR: Serendipity Optimized Language Model Aligned for Recommendation 2502.15370 (2025-02) Weakly Supervised Video Scene Graph Generation via Natural Language Supervision |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2409.17476")
get_code_for_paper("2409.17476")
have("2409.17476")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2409.17476.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2409.17476)
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