8 of 11 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 7 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2410.20197.json · badge: /api/ran/2410.20197.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| xiasong0501/grat | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
8 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| Minimize_domain_mean | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
xiasong0501/grat/one_sample_train.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("81afe23ae24a41b1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| common_direct_loss | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
xiasong0501/grat/Sam_attack_universal.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("63a5df1373ee6cc1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| common_direct_loss_weighted | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
xiasong0501/grat/Sam_attack_universal.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1a6a138af1a89077") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| input_diversity | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
xiasong0501/grat/Sam_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2a73ff4ab33a222f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 3, 4, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| normalize_tensor | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
xiasong0501/grat/Sam_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1ad6a46df9edf55e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 5, dtype family float, shape (2, 3, 4, 5, 6) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| return_mean_value | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
xiasong0501/grat/Sam_attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d64cb63ef26668bd") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 5, dtype family float, shape (2, 1, 1, 1, 1) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| select_op | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
xiasong0501/grat/l2t.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("28ce88cbcad7b395") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| trace_prob | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
xiasong0501/grat/l2t.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("29e23c69b7369fa0") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| attack | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
xiasong0501/grat/anda_ct.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3c57221d88208eb2") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| calc_loss | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
xiasong0501/grat/one_sample_train.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("40f56fce40b517b1") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| vertical_shift | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
xiasong0501/grat/l2t.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e7248679b9338973") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 11 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 11 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 11 distinct functions with an identity, 3 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (2 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 8 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| select_op | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
2405.14077 (2024-05) Learning to Transform Dynamically for Better Adversarial Transferability |
|
| trace_prob | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
2405.14077 (2024-05) Learning to Transform Dynamically for Better Adversarial Transferability |
|
| vertical_shift | 1 other paper 1 later |
Guo_Boosting_Adversarial_Transferability_through_Augmentation_in_Hypothesis_Space_CVPR_2025_paper (2025 (year only)) Boosting Adversarial Transferability through Augmentation in Hypothesis Space |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
The utilization of large foundational models has a dilemma: while fine-tuning downstream tasks from them holds promise for making use of the well-generalized knowledge in practical applications, their open accessibility also poses threats of adverse usage. This paper, for the first time, explores the feasibility of adversarial attacking various downstream models fine-tuned from the segment anything model (SAM), by solely utilizing the information from the open-sourced SAM. In contrast to prevailing transfer-based adversarial attacks, we demonstrate the existence of adversarial dangers even without accessing the downstream task and dataset to train a similar surrogate model. To enhance the effectiveness of the adversarial attack towards models fine-tuned on unknown datasets, we propose a universal meta-initialization (UMI) algorithm to extract the intrinsic vulnerability inherent in the foundation model, which is then utilized as the prior knowledge to guide the generation of adversarial perturbations. Moreover, by formulating the gradient difference in the attacking process between the open-sourced SAM and its fine-tuned downstream models, we theoretically demonstrate that a deviation occurs in the adversarial update direction by directly maximizing the distance of encoded feature embeddings in the open-sourced SAM. Consequently, we propose a gradient robust loss that simulates the associated uncertainty with gradient-based noise augmentation to enhance the robustness of generated adversarial examples (AEs) towards this deviation, thus improving the transferability. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed universal meta-initialized and gradient robust adversarial attack (UMI-GRAT) toward SAMs and their downstream models. Code is available at https://github.com/xiasong0501/GRAT.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2410.20197")
get_code_for_paper("2410.20197")
have("2410.20197")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2410.20197.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2410.20197)
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