Chang Liu, Edward Raff, James Holt, Allen Booz, Hamilton, Rebecca Saul, Kristopher Micinski, Noah Fleischmann, Richard Zak
1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2410.22677.json · badge: /api/ran/2410.22677.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| FutureComputing4AI/Reverse-Engineering-Function-Search | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| analysis | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
FutureComputing4AI/Reverse-Engineering-Function-Search/data-processing/bsim/src/MRR.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ac8c062718c066e0") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 1 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Binary analysis is a core component of many critical security tasks, including reverse engineering, malware analysis, and vulnerability detection. Manual analysis is often time-consuming, but identifying commonly-used or previously-seen functions can reduce the time it takes to understand a new file. However, given the complexity of assembly, and the NP-hard nature of determining function equivalence, this task is extremely difficult. Common approaches often use sophisticated disassembly and decompilation tools, graph analysis, and other expensive preprocessing steps to perform function similarity searches over some corpus. In this work, we identify a number of discrepancies between the current research environment and the underlying application need. To remedy this, we build a new benchmark, REFUSE-BENCH, for binary function similarity detection consisting of high-quality datasets and tests that better reflect real-world use cases. In doing so, we address issues like data duplication and accurate labeling, experiment with real malware, and perform the first serious evaluation of ML binary function similarity models on Windows data. Our benchmark reveals that a new, simple baselineone which looks at only the raw bytes of a function, and requires no disassembly or other pre-processing -is able to achieve state-of-the-art performance in multiple settings. Our findings challenge conventional assumptions that complex models with highly-engineered features are being used to their full potential, and demonstrate that simpler approaches can provide significant value.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2410.22677")
get_code_for_paper("2410.22677")
have("2410.22677")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2410.22677.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2410.22677)
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