Abdurrahman Zeybey, Mehmet Ergezer, Tommy Nguyen
None of the 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories has a recorded run on a synthesized input (2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2412.02803.json · badge: /api/ran/2412.02803.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| memoatwit/universalperturbation | community Papers with Code archive |
0 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| _single_iterative_perturbation | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
memoatwit/universalperturbation/tf_attack.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("0f3ece06645506f4") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, memoatwit/universalperturbation when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| generate_iterative_perturbation | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
memoatwit/universalperturbation/tf_attack.py pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("47eb6e1ae2ca4bfc") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, memoatwit/universalperturbation when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
3D Gaussian Splatting has advanced radiance field reconstruction, enabling highquality view synthesis and fast rendering in 3D modeling. While adversarial attacks on object detection models are well-studied for 2D images, their impact on 3D models remains underexplored. This work introduces the Masked Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (M-IFGSM), designed to generate adversarial noise targeting the CLIP vision-language model. M-IFGSM specifically alters the object of interest by focusing perturbations on masked regions, degrading the performance of CLIP's zero-shot object detection capability when applied to 3D models. Using eight objects from the Common Objects 3D (CO3D) dataset, we demonstrate that our method effectively reduces the accuracy and confidence of the model, with adversarial noise being nearly imperceptible to human observers. The top-1 accuracy in original model renders drops from 95.4% to 12.5% for train images and from 91.2% to 35.4% for test images, with confidence levels reflecting this shift from true classification to misclassification, underscoring the risks of adversarial attacks on 3D models in applications such as autonomous driving, robotics, and surveillance. The significance of this research lies in its potential to expose vulnerabilities in modern 3D vision models, including radiance fields, prompting the development of more robust defenses and security measures in critical real-world applications.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2412.02803")
get_code_for_paper("2412.02803")
have("2412.02803")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2412.02803.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2412.02803)
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