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Paper · 2501.13776 · AAAI · 2025

Crossfire: An Elastic Defense Framework for Graph Neural Networks Under Bit Flip Attacks

Nils Kriege, Lorenz Kummer, Samir Moustafa, Wilfried Gansterer

arXiv · PDF

Code that ran

None of the 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories has a recorded run on a synthesized input (2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.

"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2501.13776.json · badge: /api/ran/2501.13776.svg

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RepositoryRoleRan
lorenz0890/crossfireaaai2025 community
Papers with Code archive
0 ran · 2 no recorded run
FunctionStatusWhere it lives
BFABase Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
lorenz0890/crossfireaaai2025/pyq/pyq/fia/bfa/attack_gcn_molhiv_molpcba/IBFA.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("3c35714ce7882cef")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, lorenz0890/crossfireaaai2025 when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

InjectivityBFA Not yet run
unverified (harvested, no recorded run)
lorenz0890/crossfireaaai2025/pyq/pyq/fia/bfa/attack_gcn_molhiv_molpcba/IBFA.py
pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("eda51d145bc59104")
How it ran

The body of this sample is withheld: GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, lorenz0890/crossfireaaai2025 when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded.

Also present in other papers' code

Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).

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Repositories linked to this paper

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Abstract

Bit Flip Attacks (BFAs) are a well-established class of adversarial attacks, originally developed for Convolutional Neural Networks within the computer vision domain. Most recently, these attacks have been extended to target Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), revealing significant vulnerabilities. This new development naturally raises questions about the best strategies to defend GNNs against BFAs, a challenge for which no solutions currently exist. Given the applications of GNNs in critical fields, any defense mechanism must not only maintain network performance, but also verifiably restore the network to its pre-attack state. Verifiably restoring the network to its pre-attack state also eliminates the need for costly evaluations on test data to ensure network quality. We offer first insights into the effectiveness of existing honeypotand hashing-based defenses against BFAs adapted from the computer vision domain to GNNs, and characterize the shortcomings of these approaches. To overcome their limitations, we propose Crossfire, a hybrid approach that exploits weight sparsity and combines hashing and honeypots with bit-level correction of out-of-distribution weight elements to restore network integrity. Crossfire is retraining-free and does not require labeled data. Averaged over 2,160 experiments on six benchmark datasets, Crossfire offers a 21.8% higher probability than its competitors of reconstructing a GNN attacked by a BFA to its pre-attack state. These experiments cover up to 55 bit flips from various attacks. Moreover, it improves postrepair prediction quality by 10.85%. Computational and storage overheads are negligible compared to the inherent complexity of even the simplest GNNs.

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