We have not lifted any functions out of this paper's repositories yet, so there is nothing we have run. The repositories linked to it are listed below.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate grounded responses by leveraging external knowledge databases without altering model parameters. Although the absence of weight tuning prevents leakage via model parameters, it introduces the risk of inference adversaries exploiting retrieved documents in the model's context. Existing methods for membership inference and data extraction often rely on jailbreaking or carefully crafted unnatural queries, which can be easily detected or thwarted with query rewriting techniques common in RAG systems. In this work, we present Interrogation Attack (IA), a membership inference technique targeting documents in the RAG datastore. By crafting natural-text queries that are answerable only with the target document's presence, our approach demonstrates successful inference with just 30 queries while remaining stealthy; straightforward detectors identify adversarial prompts from existing methods up to ~76x more frequently than those generated by our attack. We observe a 2x improvement in TPR@1%FPR over prior inference attacks across diverse RAG configurations, all while costing less than $0.02 per document inference.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2502.00306")
get_code_for_paper("2502.00306")
have("2502.00306")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2502.00306.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2502.00306)
Connect an agent — have() is free.