1 of 1 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2502.01385.json · badge: /api/ran/2502.01385.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| total_variation_loss | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples/backdoor_sample_detector/cognitive_distillation.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d85c705653a8ceef") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned Tensor, ndim 1, dtype family float, shape (2,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 1 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 1 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 1 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 1 later) and 0 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| total_variation_loss | 1 other paper 1 later |
2505.05528 (2025-05) X-Transfer Attacks: Towards Super Transferable Adversarial Attacks on CLIP |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Contrastive language-image pretraining (CLIP) has been found to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks where the adversary can achieve an almost perfect attack success rate on CLIP models by poisoning only 0.01\% of the training dataset. This raises security concerns on the current practice of pretraining large-scale models on unscrutinized web data using CLIP. In this work, we analyze the representations of backdoor-poisoned samples learned by CLIP models and find that they exhibit unique characteristics in their local subspace, i.e., their local neighborhoods are far more sparse than that of clean samples. Based on this finding, we conduct a systematic study on detecting CLIP backdoor attacks and show that these attacks can be easily and efficiently detected by traditional density ratio-based local outlier detectors, whereas existing backdoor sample detection methods fail. Our experiments also reveal that an unintentional backdoor already exists in the original CC3M dataset and has been trained into a popular open-source model released by OpenCLIP. Based on our detector, one can clean up a million-scale web dataset (e.g., CC3M) efficiently within 15 minutes using 4 Nvidia A100 GPUs. The code is publicly available in our \href{https://github.com/HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples}{GitHub repository}.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2502.01385")
get_code_for_paper("2502.01385")
have("2502.01385")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2502.01385.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2502.01385)
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