Pin-Yu Chen, Prasanna Sattigeri, Giulio Zizzo, Kush Varshney, Giandomenico Cornacchia, Kieran Fraser, Muhammad Zaid, Hameed Ambrish, Rawat Beat Buesser, Mark Purcell
2 of 2 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 1 has no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2502.15427.json · badge: /api/ran/2502.15427.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
2 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| get_plot | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation/scripts/main_evaluate.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ff7ed3a671bd2838") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Sonnet 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| handle_prediction | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation/scripts/main_evaluate.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("4d0b96e1cdd1c174") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Sonnet 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 2 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 2 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 2 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 2 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
As large language models (LLMs) become integrated into everyday applications, ensuring their robustness and security is increasingly critical. In particular, LLMs can be manipulated into unsafe behaviour by prompts known as jailbreaks. The variety of jailbreak styles is growing, necessitating the use of external defences known as guardrails. While many jailbreak defences have been proposed, not all defences are able to handle new out-of-distribution attacks due to the narrow segment of jailbreaks used to align them. Moreover, the lack of systematisation around defences has created significant gaps in their practical application. In this work, we perform systematic benchmarking across 15 different defences, considering a broad swathe of malicious and benign datasets. We find that there is significant performance variation depending on the style of jailbreak a defence is subject to. Additionally, we show that based on current datasets available for evaluation, simple baselines can display competitive out-of-distribution performance compared to many state-of-the-art defences. Code is available at https://github.com/IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2502.15427")
get_code_for_paper("2502.15427")
have("2502.15427")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2502.15427.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2502.15427)
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