Maksym Andriushchenko, Sahar Abdelnabi, David Schmotz, Luca Beurer-Kellner
5 of 7 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 5 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2602.20156.json · badge: /api/ran/2602.20156.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| aisa-group/skill-inject | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
5 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| create_variant_injections | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
aisa-group/skill-inject/experiments/ablations/bo5_by_skill_line_task.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0865d770b066e41c") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_skill_content | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
aisa-group/skill-inject/judges/skill_screening_judge.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6019d72f1441b856") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_skill_scripts | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
aisa-group/skill-inject/judges/skill_screening_judge.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3d82d8d308995ea0") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| inject_into_skill | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
aisa-group/skill-inject/judges/skill_screening_judge.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7766fa03599c5d33") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_tasks | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
aisa-group/skill-inject/judges/utility_baseline_judge.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("39d3d3516b652e6f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_skill_path | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
aisa-group/skill-inject/config.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("32ef1d442a793d2b") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| resolve_models | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
aisa-group/skill-inject/config.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f559d6eafdd4adf7") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 7 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 7 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 7 distinct functions with an identity, 0 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized thirdparty code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SKILL-INJECT, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SKILL-INJECT contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SKILL-INJECT, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomwarelike behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2602.20156")
get_code_for_paper("2602.20156")
have("2602.20156")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2602.20156.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2602.20156)
Connect an agent — have() is free.