Pin-Yu Chen, Sheng-Yen Chou, Tsung-Yi Ho
8 of 15 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 5 have no contract verdict; 3 failures of our instrument; 7 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper.json · badge: /api/ran/Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| IBM/BadDiffusion | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
8 ran · 7 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| auto_rows_cols | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/BadDiffusion/anp_util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("35d6234d5937647b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| batch_sampling | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/model.py pointer only (licence: Apache-2.0); the stored copy get_code serves, from invisibletriggerdiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("68b412f99839b629") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (Apache-2.0), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from invisibletriggerdiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| get_grid_size | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/BadDiffusion/anp_util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("92940c6c2beee371") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family int; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| normalize | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/BadDiffusion/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3b79327399fa95f6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| p_losses_diffuser | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
IBM/BadDiffusion/loss.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("82fe5c3e9ba22a97") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| path_gen | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/BadDiffusion/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c80b476232d096b6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| q_sample_diffuser | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
IBM/BadDiffusion/loss.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f70bd3df0ffba5cd") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 4, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| read_json | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
IBM/BadDiffusion/baddiffusion.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("410e560ea7b3decb") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| batch_sampling_save | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/model.py pointer only (licence: Apache-2.0); the stored copy get_code serves, from invisibletriggerdiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("ffd3703863aadaca") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (Apache-2.0), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from invisibletriggerdiffusion/invisible_triggers_for_diffusion, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| calculate_activation_statistics | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/fid_score.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a17aa1b06ec919e8") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| calculate_frechet_distance | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/fid_score.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0def50a351111624") How it ranno invocation recorded. this sample carries JSON test cases instead of a setup block; get_reference_implementation serves them with the level they back. |
| get_activations | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/fid_score.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9f5980b8530c7409") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| match_count | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("249f0aa58e000fbc") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| write_json | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/anp_config.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("a9dabfb1026845ab") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| write_json | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
IBM/BadDiffusion/anp_util.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0fd705e26a0e56cb") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 15 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 15 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 14 distinct functions with an identity, 7 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 7 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| calculate_frechet_distance | 74 other papers 32 dated earlier, 24 later, 18 same year, order not determinable |
1610.09585 (2016-10) Conditional Image Synthesis With Auxiliary Classifier GANs |
1706.08500 (2017-06) GANs Trained by a Two Time-Scale Update Rule Converge to a Local Nash Equilibrium 1807.11458 (2018-07) To learn image super-resolution, use a GAN to learn how to do image degradation first and 71 more not named here |
| calculate_activation_statistics | 10 other papers 7 later, 3 same year, order not determinable |
2305.08192 (2023-05) Diffusion Models for Imperceptible and Transferable Adversarial Attack |
2306.06874 (2023-06) VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models 2312.12030 (2023-12) Towards Accurate Guided Diffusion Sampling through Symplectic Adjoint Method and 7 more not named here |
| get_activations | 6 other papers 4 later, 2 same year, order not determinable |
2306.06874 (2023-06) VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models |
2312.12030 (2023-12) Towards Accurate Guided Diffusion Sampling through Symplectic Adjoint Method aaai_28602 (2024 (year only)) Reducing Spatial Fitting Error in Distillation of Denoising Diffusion Models and 3 more not named here |
| read_json | 2 other papers 1 later, 1 same year, order not determinable |
2306.06874 (2023-06) VillanDiffusion: A Unified Backdoor Attack Framework for Diffusion Models |
Han_UIBDiffusion_Universal_Imperceptible_Backdoor_Attack_for_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2025_paper (2025 (year only)) UIBDiffusion: Universal Imperceptible Backdoor Attack for Diffusion Models |
| batch_sampling | 1 other paper 1 later |
2406.00816 (2024-06) Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models |
|
| batch_sampling_save | 1 other paper 1 later |
2406.00816 (2024-06) Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models |
|
| p_losses_diffuser | 1 other paper 1 later |
2406.00816 (2024-06) Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Diffusion Models |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Diffusion models are state-of-the-art deep learning empowered generative models that are trained based on the principle of learning forward and reverse diffusion processes via progressive noise-addition and denoising. To gain a better understanding of the limitations and potential risks, this paper presents the first study on the robustness of diffusion models against backdoor attacks. Specifically, we propose BadDiffusion, a novel attack framework that engineers compromised diffusion processes during model training for backdoor implantation. At the inference stage, the backdoored diffusion model will behave just like an untampered generator for regular data inputs, while falsely generating some targeted outcome designed by the bad actor upon receiving the implanted trigger signal. Such a critical risk can be dreadful for downstream tasks and applications built upon the problematic model. Our extensive experiments on various backdoor attack settings show that BadDiffusion can consistently lead to compromised diffusion models with high utility and target specificity. Even worse, BadDiffusion can be made cost-effective by simply finetuning a clean pre-trained diffusion model to implant backdoors. We also explore some possible countermeasures for risk mitigation. Our results call attention to potential risks and possible misuse of diffusion models. Our code is available on https://github.com/IBM/BadDiffusion.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper")
get_code_for_paper("Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper")
have("Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/Chou_How_to_Backdoor_Diffusion_Models_CVPR_2023_paper)
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