7 of 10 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 7 have no contract verdict; 0 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/1904.08653.json · badge: /api/ran/1904.08653.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2 | community (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
7 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| distort_image | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/image.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("90b2ef0e95527027") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Image. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_max_probability | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/craft_adv.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("fcefecd930437474") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 1, dtype family float, shape (2,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_printability_array | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/craft_adv.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("cd1c26da502bc987") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (3, 3, 4, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_conv | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2329e9023f218b7e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_conv_bn | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("bff835defe62db44") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| rand_scale | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/image.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6a4124c294bed05b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| scale_image_channel | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/image.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("835b72f71b599016") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Image. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| build_targets | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/region_loss.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from lintotao/out-of-bbox-attack, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("bafb242ad7347214") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from lintotao/out-of-bbox-attack, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| calc_nps | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/craft_adv.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7c3e3f84afa179de") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| parse_cfg | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
Zhang-Jack/adversarial_yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("93c283a4f6e6c40f") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 10 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 10 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 10 distinct functions with an identity, 7 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (0 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 7 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| build_targets | 3 other papers 3 later |
2203.03373 (2022-03) Adversarial Texture for Fooling Person Detectors in the Physical World |
2210.16765 (2022-10) Benchmarking Adversarial Patch Against Aerial Detection 2410.10091 (2024-10) Out-of-Bounding-Box Triggers: A Stealthy Approach to Cheat Object Detectors |
| parse_cfg | 3 other papers 3 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
2004.10934 (2020-04) YOLOv4: Optimal Speed and Accuracy of Object Detection 2203.03373 (2022-03) Adversarial Texture for Fooling Person Detectors in the Physical World |
| load_conv | 2 other papers 2 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
2203.03373 (2022-03) Adversarial Texture for Fooling Person Detectors in the Physical World |
| load_conv_bn | 2 other papers 2 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
2203.03373 (2022-03) Adversarial Texture for Fooling Person Detectors in the Physical World |
| distort_image | 1 other paper 1 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
|
| rand_scale | 1 other paper 1 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
|
| scale_image_channel | 1 other paper 1 later |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Adversarial attacks on machine learning models have seen increasing interest in the past years. By making only subtle changes to the input of a convolutional neural network, the output of the network can be swayed to output a completely different result. The first attacks did this by changing pixel values of an input image slightly to fool a classifier to output the wrong class. Other approaches have tried to learn "patches" that can be applied to an object to fool detectors and classifiers. Some of these approaches have also shown that these attacks are feasible in the real-world, i.e. by modifying an object and filming it with a video camera. However, all of these approaches target classes that contain almost no intra-class variety (e.g. stop signs). The known structure of the object is then used to generate an adversarial patch on top of it. In this paper, we present an approach to generate adversarial patches to targets with lots of intra-class variety, namely persons. The goal is to generate a patch that is able successfully hide a person from a person detector. An attack that could for instance be used maliciously to circumvent surveillance systems, intruders can sneak around undetected by holding a small cardboard plate in front of their body aimed towards the surveillance camera. From our results we can see that our system is able significantly lower the accuracy of a person detector. Our approach also functions well in real-life scenarios where the patch is filmed by a camera. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to attempt this kind of attack on targets with a high level of intra-class variety like persons.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("1904.08653")
get_code_for_paper("1904.08653")
have("1904.08653")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/1904.08653.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/1904.08653)
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