Siyuan Huang, Xiaolin Hu, Fuchun Sun, Bo Zhang, Zhanhao Hu, Xiaopei Zhu
10 of 12 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 9 have no contract verdict; 1 failure of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2203.03373.json · badge: /api/ran/2203.03373.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis not recorded on the link |
10 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| calc_gradient_penalty | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/generator_dim.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3ec68f4651c396a2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| compute_partial_repr | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/tps_grid_gen.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from WarBean/tps_stn_pytorch, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("e1814689377a5c82") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from WarBean/tps_stn_pytorch, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. A run is recorded. |
| gauss_kernel | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c3819a0a3c702ec5") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (5, 5) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_cfgs | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("69099cbbe51b9f29") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| grid_sample | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/tps_grid_gen.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3699342b51411d76") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 4, dtype family float, shape (2, 4, 3, 3) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| label_filter | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/evaluation_texture.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("047a65d91b059ef1") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_conv | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2329e9023f218b7e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_conv_bn | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("bff835defe62db44") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| truths_length | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/evaluation_texture.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7fc3c3693b8f5dd9") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| truths_length | Ran ran on a synthesized input |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7159fc477010029f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| build_targets | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/yolo2/region_loss.py pointer only (licence: MIT); the stored copy get_code serves, from lintotao/out-of-bbox-attack, is pointer only (licence: NONE) · get_code("bafb242ad7347214") How it ranThe body of this sample is withheld: this paper's link allows the body inline (MIT), but get_code serves the stored copy, first harvested from lintotao/out-of-bbox-attack, and GitHub detected no licence in that repository when it was checked. The setup block that called it is withheld with it, because it is written against that body. source_path and origin say where the code lives, to read under the repository's own terms. No invocation recorded. |
| parse_cfg | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
WhoTHU/Adversarial_Texture/yolo2/cfg.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("93c283a4f6e6c40f") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 12 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 12 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 12 distinct functions with an identity, 5 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (5 with at least one paper dated earlier, 1 the same month, 2 later) and 7 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| compute_partial_repr | 5 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 3 later · 1 only as an assembly brick |
1509.05329 (2015-09) Recurrent Spatial Transformer Networks |
2203.09388 (2022-03) A Text Attention Network for Spatial Deformation Robust Scene Text Image Super-resolution 2207.09840 (2022-07) EleGANt: Exquisite and Locally Editable GAN for Makeup Transfer and 2 more not named here |
| build_targets | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
1904.08653 (2019-04) Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection |
2210.16765 (2022-10) Benchmarking Adversarial Patch Against Aerial Detection 2410.10091 (2024-10) Out-of-Bounding-Box Triggers: A Stealthy Approach to Cheat Object Detectors |
| parse_cfg | 3 other papers 3 dated earlier |
1904.08653 (2019-04) Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection 2004.10934 (2020-04) YOLOv4: Optimal Speed and Accuracy of Object Detection |
| load_conv | 2 other papers 2 dated earlier |
1904.08653 (2019-04) Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
| load_conv_bn | 2 other papers 2 dated earlier |
1904.08653 (2019-04) Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection |
1910.00068 (2019-10) Role of Spatial Context in Adversarial Robustness for Object Detection |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Nowadays, cameras equipped with AI systems can capture and analyze images to detect people automatically. However, the AI system can make mistakes when receiving deliberately designed patterns in the real world, i.e., physical adversarial examples. Prior works have shown that it is possible to print adversarial patches on clothes to evade DNN-based person detectors. However, these adversarial examples could have catastrophic drops in the attack success rate when the viewing angle (i.e., the camera's angle towards the object) changes. To perform a multi-angle attack, we propose Adversarial Texture (AdvTexture). Ad-vTexture can cover clothes with arbitrary shapes so that people wearing such clothes can hide from person detectors from different viewing angles. We propose a generative method, named Toroidal-Cropping-based Expandable Generative Attack (TC-EGA), to craft AdvTexture with repetitive structures. We printed several pieces of cloth with AdvTexure and then made T-shirts, skirts, and dresses in the physical world. Experiments showed that these clothes could fool person detectors in the physical world.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2203.03373")
get_code_for_paper("2203.03373")
have("2203.03373")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2203.03373.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2203.03373)
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