Tom Goldstein, Furong Huang, Manli Shu, Ning Yu, Yanchao Sun, Yuancheng Xu, Jiarui Yao, Zichu Wu
12 of 15 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 5 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 7 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2402.06659.json · badge: /api/ran/2402.06659.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
11 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| umd-huang-lab/vlm-poisoning | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: classifier_2025 |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| chroma_subsampling | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d0a996dc0d594c8a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| computeIoU | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/MiniGPT-4/demo_v2.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f8e4c1c5aac977d6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| diff_round | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("37251df462837488") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (2, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| embedding_attack_Linf | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
umd-huang-lab/vlm-poisoning/poison_llava.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e57b7b37b157bb77") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned tuple. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| extract_substrings | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/MiniGPT-4/demo_v2.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5c3e6655c3b3e958") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| idct_8x8_ref | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/decompression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("effed979be6d9fe9") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ndarray, ndim 2, dtype family float, shape (8, 8) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| is_overlapping | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/MiniGPT-4/demo_v2.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("37438be3369e6493") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned bool, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_image | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/LLaVA/predict.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9b3c1cb391672ccb") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Image. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_image | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/eval_poison_llava.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("bb945d226af806a7") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Image. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_image | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/poison_llava.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1780d801d03a6325") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Image. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_image_tensors | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/poison_llava.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("289a615cef916907") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 5, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| quality_to_factor | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("8ae1de364298b758") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| getAug_lavisCLIP | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/augmentation_zoo.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b6264dd23f32f494") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| rgb_to_ycbcr | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f9b6705425c9fde9") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| rgb_to_ycbcr_jpeg | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning/DiffJPEG/compression.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("b173cfe45291c442") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 15 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 15 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 15 distinct functions with an identity, 11 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (11 with at least one paper dated earlier, 2 the same month, 5 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| load_image | 85 other papers 14 dated earlier, 4 the same month, 63 later, 4 same year, order not determinable |
2112.05682 (2021-12) Self-attention Does Not Need $O(n^2)$ Memory |
2305.10973 (2023-05) Drag Your GAN: Interactive Point-based Manipulation on the Generative Image Manifold 2307.10490 (2023-07) Abusing Images and Sounds for Indirect Instruction Injection in Multi-Modal LLMs and 82 more not named here |
| load_image | 10 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 7 later, 1 same year, order not determinable |
2311.06783 (2023-11) Q-Instruct: Improving Low-level Visual Abilities for Multi-modality Foundation Models |
2024.findings-acl.573 (2024 (year only)) Visual Hallucinations of Multi-modal Large Language Models 2402.14683 (2024-02) Visual Hallucinations of Multi-modal Large Language Models and 7 more not named here |
| computeIoU | 6 other papers 2 dated earlier, 3 later, 1 same year, order not determinable |
2310.09478 (2023-10) MiniGPT-v2: large language model as a unified interface for vision-language multi-task learning |
2312.16862 (2023-12) TinyGPT-V: Efficient Multimodal Large Language Model via Small Backbones 2024.findings-emnlp.803 (2024 (year only)) Cross-modality Information Check for Detecting Jailbreaking in Multimodal Large Language Models and 3 more not named here |
| diff_round | 6 other papers 6 dated earlier |
2108.09034 (2021-08) AdvDrop: Adversarial Attack to DNNs by Dropping Information |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images 2207.03574 (2022-07) Demystifying the Adversarial Robustness of Random Transformation Defenses and 3 more not named here |
| extract_substrings | 5 other papers 3 dated earlier, 2 later |
2310.09478 (2023-10) MiniGPT-v2: large language model as a unified interface for vision-language multi-task learning |
2311.15826 (2023-11) GeoChat: Grounded Large Vision-Language Model for Remote Sensing 2312.16862 (2023-12) TinyGPT-V: Efficient Multimodal Large Language Model via Small Backbones and 2 more not named here |
| is_overlapping | 5 other papers 2 dated earlier, 3 later |
2310.09478 (2023-10) MiniGPT-v2: large language model as a unified interface for vision-language multi-task learning |
2312.16862 (2023-12) TinyGPT-V: Efficient Multimodal Large Language Model via Small Backbones 2403.02076 (2024-03) VTG-GPT: Tuning-Free Zero-Shot Video Temporal Grounding with GPT and 2 more not named here |
| quality_to_factor | 4 other papers 4 dated earlier |
2108.09034 (2021-08) AdvDrop: Adversarial Attack to DNNs by Dropping Information |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images 2309.03020 (2023-09) SEAL: A Framework for Systematic Evaluation of Real-World Super-Resolution and 1 more not named here |
| chroma_subsampling | 2 other papers 2 dated earlier |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
2308.11804 (2023-08) Adversarial Illusions in Multi-Modal Embeddings |
| rgb_to_ycbcr | 2 other papers 2 dated earlier |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
2308.11804 (2023-08) Adversarial Illusions in Multi-Modal Embeddings |
| idct_8x8_ref | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
|
| rgb_to_ycbcr_jpeg | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
Wu_Robust_Image_Forgery_Detection_Over_Online_Social_Network_Shared_Images_CVPR_2022_paper (2022 (year only)) Robust Image Forgery Detection over Online Social Network Shared Images |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel in generating textual responses from visual inputs, but their versatility raises security concerns. This study takes the first step in exposing VLMs' susceptibility to data poisoning attacks that can manipulate responses to innocuous, everyday prompts. We introduce Shadowcast, a stealthy data poisoning attack where poison samples are visually indistinguishable from benign images with matching texts. Shadowcast demonstrates effectiveness in two attack types. The first is a traditional Label Attack, tricking VLMs into misidentifying class labels, such as confusing Donald Trump for Joe Biden. The second is a novel Persuasion Attack, leveraging VLMs' text generation capabilities to craft persuasive and seemingly rational narratives for misinformation, such as portraying junk food as healthy. We show that Shadowcast effectively achieves the attacker's intentions using as few as 50 poison samples. Crucially, the poisoned samples demonstrate transferability across different VLM architectures, posing a significant concern in black-box settings. Moreover, Shadowcast remains potent under realistic conditions involving various text prompts, training data augmentation, and image compression techniques. This work reveals how poisoned VLMs can disseminate convincing yet deceptive misinformation to everyday, benign users, emphasizing the importance of data integrity for responsible VLM deployments. Our code is available at: https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/VLM-Poisoning.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2402.06659")
get_code_for_paper("2402.06659")
have("2402.06659")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2402.06659.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2402.06659)
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