Bo Li, Zhen Xiang, Radha Poovendran, Fengqing Jiang, Zhangchen Xu, Luyao Niu, ✠ Bhaskar
13 of 15 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 2 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 11 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2402.11753.json · badge: /api/ran/2402.11753.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| uw-nsl/ArtPrompt | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
13 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| data_aug | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ca75b2499529e8cb") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| extract_content | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/safe_eval.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("48fa5a3bd20a9af2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| file_path | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/baseline.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("154f863add107767") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_dataset | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3415bcd72eb5f696") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_merge_table | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/bpe.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("990d82424d309a3b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Sonnet 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_subword_nmt_table | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/bpe.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("03e9a6a74a57cc23") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Sonnet 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned dict. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| parse | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/dataset.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("48cf084f7ea0ecf5") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned StringIO. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| path_parser | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/benchmark.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3967818d71115e88") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| ss_eval_handler | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/safe_eval.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("c7169796d02d7050") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned float, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| tokenize_word | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/bpe.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d7a0c20cde2f68a7") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Sonnet 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| zs_long | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/prompt.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("90c44885d43d87c6") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| zs_single_all | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/prompt.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("65e0f6c8835eaaa8") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| zs_single_sep | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/utils/prompt.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("dd02ccf2f7248cc2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_dataset | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/baseline.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("afc3d7ae4b26453d") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| mask_word_stop | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
uw-nsl/ArtPrompt/jailbreak/attack_utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2abb20aa39df0144") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 15 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 15 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 15 distinct functions with an identity, 4 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (3 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 4 later) and 11 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| load_merge_table | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
1910.13267 (2019-10) BPE-Dropout: Simple and Effective Subword Regularization |
2410.10343 (2024-10) Locking Down the Finetuned LLMs Safety 2410.21492 (2024-10) FATH: Authentication-based Test-time Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks |
| load_subword_nmt_table | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
1910.13267 (2019-10) BPE-Dropout: Simple and Effective Subword Regularization |
2410.10343 (2024-10) Locking Down the Finetuned LLMs Safety 2410.21492 (2024-10) FATH: Authentication-based Test-time Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks |
| tokenize_word | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
1910.13267 (2019-10) BPE-Dropout: Simple and Effective Subword Regularization |
2410.10343 (2024-10) Locking Down the Finetuned LLMs Safety 2410.21492 (2024-10) FATH: Authentication-based Test-time Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks |
| mask_word_stop | 1 other paper 1 later |
2406.12935 (2024-06) ChatBug: A Common Vulnerability of Aligned LLMs Induced by Chat Templates |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised finetuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (VITC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs. Our code is available at https: //github.com/uw-nsl/ArtPrompt.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2402.11753")
get_code_for_paper("2402.11753")
have("2402.11753")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2402.11753.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2402.11753)
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