3 of 5 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 2 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2406.12935.json · badge: /api/ran/2406.12935.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| uw-nsl/ChatBug | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
3 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| is_cuda_OOM | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
uw-nsl/ChatBug/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("54efe04544a5282a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned bool, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_jinja_template | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ChatBug/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("63d4b0b8df6ed4bd") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Template. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| try_with_excuable_batch_size | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
uw-nsl/ChatBug/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("39823c70f680a83a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned function. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| mask_word_stop | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
uw-nsl/ChatBug/artprompt.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2abb20aa39df0144") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| override_config | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
uw-nsl/ChatBug/chatbug.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7f2c5700d03f738a") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 5 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 5 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 5 distinct functions with an identity, 1 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (1 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| mask_word_stop | 1 other paper 1 dated earlier |
2402.11753 (2024-02) ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be considered offensive |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2406.12935")
get_code_for_paper("2406.12935")
have("2406.12935")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2406.12935.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2406.12935)
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