13 of 16 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 12 failures of our instrument; 3 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; repository links from the Papers with Code archive attributed under CC BY-SA, no affiliation; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2402.16459.json · badge: /api/ran/2402.16459.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
12 ran · 3 no recorded run |
| yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
1 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| extract_json | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/PAIR/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d7a1e728e5b74d3f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_attacker_system_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/PAIR/system_prompts.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("41afa37a7f32ead4") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_embedding_layer | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/GCG/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0bf2136a7171ae80") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Embedding. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_init_msg | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/PAIR/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e5d6b48c8179a8d3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_judge_system_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/PAIR/system_prompts.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("581e46fff7eed12a") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_parser | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/arguments.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("99b925af061ea18f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned ArgumentParser. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_recursive_key | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("5de204a83268b25b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_model_and_tokenizer | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/attacks/autodan.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("3bcc8e42ea5e457e") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 2, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. The code mentions cuda, and the harness aliases cuda to the CPU for every sample; whether this run needed that is not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_prompts | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("37cddda277e8045d") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_tokenizer | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense/llm_jailbreaking_defense/models.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("ee5d16865ecd5e2b") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Mock. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| parse_args | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/arguments.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("15642ad4bb2fccb7") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Namespace. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| process_target_response | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/PAIR/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9fdfb4537f5fd761") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| roulette_wheel_selection | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/attacks/autodan.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1fe7dbe6f5cc4593") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| autodan_sample_control | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/attacks/autodan.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("6c4da698c1f967dc") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_embedding_matrix | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/GCG/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("688aaeba506e3329") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_embeddings | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
yihanwang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense-backtranslation/GCG/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f556dda0785f3c77") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 16 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 16 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 16 distinct functions with an identity, 7 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (5 with at least one paper dated earlier, 2 the same month, 7 later) and 9 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| get_embedding_layer | 6 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 4 later |
2310.15140 (2023-10) AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models |
2402.05467 (2024-02) Rapid Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs via Subconscious Exploitation and Echopraxia 2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck and 3 more not named here |
| get_embedding_matrix | 6 other papers 1 the same month, 5 later |
2402.09063 (2024-02) Soft Prompt Threats: Attacking Safety Alignment and Unlearning in Open-Source LLMs through the Embedding Space |
2403.04957 (2024-03) Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models 2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck and 3 more not named here |
| get_embeddings | 5 other papers 5 later |
2403.04957 (2024-03) Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models |
2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck 2405.21018 (2024-05) Improved Techniques for Optimization-Based Jailbreaking on Large Language Models and 2 more not named here |
| get_init_msg | 5 other papers 1 dated earlier, 4 later |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2403.00867 (2024-03) Gradient Cuff: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models by Exploring Refusal Loss Landscapes 2404.02151 (2024-04) Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks and 2 more not named here |
| process_target_response | 5 other papers 1 dated earlier, 4 later |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2404.02151 (2024-04) Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks 2404.12038 (2024-04) Uncovering Safety Risks of Large Language Models through Concept Activation Vector and 2 more not named here |
| extract_json | 3 other papers 1 dated earlier, 2 later |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2404.02151 (2024-04) Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks 2404.12038 (2024-04) Uncovering Safety Risks of Large Language Models through Concept Activation Vector |
| roulette_wheel_selection | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
2310.04451 (2023-10) AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models |
2410.04234 (2024-10) Functional Homotopy: Smoothing Discrete Optimization via Continuous Parameters for LLM Jailbreak Attacks |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Although many large language models (LLMs) have been trained to refuse harmful requests, they are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks which rewrite the original prompt to conceal its harmful intent. In this paper, we propose a new method for defending LLMs against jailbreaking attacks by ``backtranslation''. Specifically, given an initial response generated by the target LLM from an input prompt, our backtranslation prompts a language model to infer an input prompt that can lead to the response. The inferred prompt is called the backtranslated prompt which tends to reveal the actual intent of the original prompt, since it is generated based on the LLM's response and not directly manipulated by the attacker. We then run the target LLM again on the backtranslated prompt, and we refuse the original prompt if the model refuses the backtranslated prompt. We explain that the proposed defense provides several benefits on its effectiveness and efficiency. We empirically demonstrate that our defense significantly outperforms the baselines, in the cases that are hard for the baselines, and our defense also has little impact on the generation quality for benign input prompts. Our implementation is based on our library for LLM jailbreaking defense algorithms at \url{https://github.com/YihanWang617/llm-jailbreaking-defense}, and the code for reproducing our experiments is available at \url{https://github.com/YihanWang617/LLM-Jailbreaking-Defense-Backtranslation}.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2402.16459")
get_code_for_paper("2402.16459")
have("2402.16459")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2402.16459.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2402.16459)
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