Nicolas Flammarion, Andriushchenko Maksym
8 of 8 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 1 honoured the contract we drafted, 1 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 6 failures of our instrument; 0 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2404.02151.json · badge: /api/ran/2404.02151.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
8 ran · 0 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| extract_json | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d7a1e728e5b74d3f") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_init_msg | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e5d6b48c8179a8d3") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_judge_system_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/prompts.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("60e7444ebd37a613") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_universal_manual_prompt | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/prompts.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f068afb2c6ea7a65") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| insert_adv_string | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7ee9f8f9d7d18561") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| judge_rule_based | Ran ran, violated the contract we drafted |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/judges.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("1defc435fe20c199") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned bool, ndim 0, dtype family float, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| process_target_response | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/common.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("9fdfb4537f5fd761") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| schedule_n_to_change_fixed | Ran ran, honoured the contract we drafted |
tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks/utils.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("e16b1b174bb196d2") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned int, ndim 0, dtype family int, shape () as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
Of 8 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 8 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 8 distinct functions with an identity, 4 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (4 with at least one paper dated earlier, 3 the same month, 3 later) and 4 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| get_init_msg | 5 other papers 3 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 1 later |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation 2403.00867 (2024-03) Gradient Cuff: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models by Exploring Refusal Loss Landscapes and 2 more not named here |
| process_target_response | 5 other papers 2 dated earlier, 1 the same month, 2 later |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation 2404.12038 (2024-04) Uncovering Safety Risks of Large Language Models through Concept Activation Vector and 2 more not named here |
| extract_json | 3 other papers 2 dated earlier, 1 the same month |
2311.03191 (2023-11) DeepInception: Hypnotize Large Language Model to Be Jailbreaker |
2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation 2404.12038 (2024-04) Uncovering Safety Risks of Large Language Models through Concept Activation Vector |
| get_judge_system_prompt | 2 other papers 1 dated earlier, 1 later |
2403.00867 (2024-03) Gradient Cuff: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models by Exploring Refusal Loss Landscapes |
2409.14866 (2024-09) PAPILLON: Efficient and Stealthy Fuzz Testing-Powered Jailbreaks for LLMs |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize a target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve 100% attack success rate-according to GPT-4 as a judge-on Vicuna-13B, Mistral-7B, Phi-3-Mini, Nemotron-4-340B, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Llama-3-Instruct-8B, Gemma-7B, GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models-that do not expose logprobs-via either a transfer or prefilling attack with a 100% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models-a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking-which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings, it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). For reproducibility purposes, we provide the code, logs, and jailbreak artifacts in the JailbreakBench format at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2404.02151")
get_code_for_paper("2404.02151")
have("2404.02151")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2404.02151.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2404.02151)
Connect an agent — have() is free.