Zhi Xu, Han Liu, Jiaqi Li, Hong Yu, Xiaotong Zhang
7 of 9 samples (functions and classes) lifted from this paper's linked repositories executed on a synthesized input in Syntology's jail (0 of them constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 honoured the contract we drafted, 0 violated it and 0 have no contract verdict; 7 failures of our instrument; 2 no recorded run), measured 2026-11-22; bodies inline only under a permissive licence as GitHub detects it. Not a reproduction of the paper's results.
"Ran" means the function executed on a synthesized input and returned a value. It is not a reproduction of the paper's results. This record, dated, as JSON: /api/ran/2603.03081.json · badge: /api/ran/2603.03081.svg
Each repository's role is a label: a classifier's output recorded on the link, or, where no role is recorded, what the Papers with Code archive marked. The line under it names its basis. Neither says who wrote the code.
| Repository | Role | Ran |
|---|---|---|
| ZevineXu/TAO-Attack | canonical (classifier label) classifier basis: census |
7 ran · 2 no recorded run |
| Function | Status | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| check_for_attack_success | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("2b431b29ac3d458c") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned tuple, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| combine_prompts | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/api_experiments/evaluate_api_models.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("71b177b3a3ed6078") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned str. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| generate | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7ced740e66b4569d") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 1, dtype family int, shape (4,) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_embedding_layer | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("0bf2136a7171ae80") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Embedding. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| load_prompts | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/api_experiments/evaluate_api_models.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("645890ba00019a69") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned list, ndim 1, dtype family float; no output shape is stated. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type and ndim on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| make_checking_fn | Ran ran; our contract draft was wrong, not the code |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/api_experiments/evaluate_api_models.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("d0e94f216f27f804") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned function. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| pad_embeds | Ran ran; the contract check could not run (RAISES, DEP_MISSING or TIMEOUT) |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/attack.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("7f2fb90d5c12909d") How it ranRan in Syntology's sandbox on this synthesized input (drafted by a language model, Claude Haiku 4.5, prompt python_fixture_v1, through the batch API) and returned Tensor, ndim 3, dtype family float, shape (2, 5, 4) as a later run recorded it. The image it ran in was not recorded. If your copy returns the same type, ndim and shape on these inputs, it matched what we observed; nothing here checks that. It does NOT mean the output is correct: nothing has compared it to the paper.
|
| get_embedding_matrix | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("688aaeba506e3329") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
| get_embeddings | Not yet run unverified (harvested, no recorded run) |
ZevineXu/TAO-Attack/llm_attacks/base/attack_manager.py code served (permissive licence) · get_code("f556dda0785f3c77") How it ranno invocation recorded. |
Of 9 samples lifted from this paper's linked repositories, 9 carry a function identity and 0 do not. Of the 9 distinct functions with an identity, 6 are also present in other papers whose code we hold (6 with at least one paper dated earlier, 0 the same month, 0 later) and 3 are only here among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (as of 2026-09-26).
Only here means: among the 52,977 papers whose code Syntology holds (51,887 with lifted samples, 1,090 through their assemblies only), as of 2026-09-26, no other paper's lifted samples or current assembly bricks contain an identical function body after normalisation.
| Function | Also present in | Earliest-dated | Others named |
|---|---|---|---|
| get_embedding_layer | 6 other papers 6 dated earlier |
2310.15140 (2023-10) AutoDAN: Interpretable Gradient-Based Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models |
2402.05467 (2024-02) Rapid Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs via Subconscious Exploitation and Echopraxia 2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation and 3 more not named here |
| get_embedding_matrix | 6 other papers 6 dated earlier |
2402.09063 (2024-02) Soft Prompt Threats: Attacking Safety Alignment and Unlearning in Open-Source LLMs through the Embedding Space |
2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation 2403.04957 (2024-03) Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models and 3 more not named here |
| get_embeddings | 5 other papers 5 dated earlier |
2402.16459 (2024-02) Defending LLMs against Jailbreaking Attacks via Backtranslation |
2403.04957 (2024-03) Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models 2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck and 2 more not named here |
| combine_prompts | 3 other papers 3 dated earlier |
2402.12991 (2024-02) TRAP: Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt Honeypot for Black-Box Identification |
2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck 2406.01288 (2024-06) Improved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses |
| load_prompts | 3 other papers 3 dated earlier |
2402.12991 (2024-02) TRAP: Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt Honeypot for Black-Box Identification |
2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck 2406.01288 (2024-06) Improved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses |
| make_checking_fn | 3 other papers 3 dated earlier |
2402.12991 (2024-02) TRAP: Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt Honeypot for Black-Box Identification |
2404.13968 (2024-04) Protecting Your LLMs with Information Bottleneck 2406.01288 (2024-06) Improved Few-Shot Jailbreaking Can Circumvent Aligned Language Models and Their Defenses |
Presence, not direction: an identical function body in two papers' repositories does not say who wrote it, which came from which, or that either paper's method rests on it. Matching is exact after normalisation, so a renamed or edited function is not matched. Dates are when papers appeared, not when code was written. Only .py files the harvester lifted are covered; notebooks are not read. A new-style arXiv id YYMM.NNNN dates a paper to the month 20YY-MM; otherwise Paper.year dates it to the year; otherwise it is undated. Dates are when the paper appeared, not when the code was written. Read 2026-11-22.
Some links come from the archived Papers with Code dataset (CC BY-SA 4.0): attribution and licence.
Warning: This paper contains text that potentially offensive and harmful. Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse applications but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where attackers craft prompts that bypass safety alignment and elicit unsafe responses. Among existing approaches, optimization-based attacks have shown strong effectiveness, yet current methods often suffer from frequent refusals, pseudo-harmful outputs, and inefficient token-level updates. In this work, we propose TAO-Attack, a new optimization-based jailbreak method. TAO-Attack employs a two-stage loss function: the first stage suppresses refusals to ensure the model continues harmful prefixes, while the second stage penalizes pseudo-harmful outputs and encourages the model toward more harmful completions. In addition, we design a directionpriority token optimization (DPTO) strategy that improves efficiency by aligning candidates with the gradient direction before considering update magnitude. Extensive experiments on multiple LLMs demonstrate that TAO-Attack consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving higher attack success rates and even reaching 100% in certain scenarios.
The same record, over MCP at https://syntology.ai/mcp:
get_harvested_code_for_paper("2603.03081")
get_code_for_paper("2603.03081")
have("2603.03081")
The run record, dated, one paper per request, free:
curl https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2603.03081.json
A badge for a README (the split and the date, never a ratio):
[](https://syntology.ai/paper/2603.03081)
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